Runaway globalization and the cultural imagination of dependency by Okwori, Jenkeri Zakari
TYDSKRIF VIR LETTERKUNDE • 44 (2) • 2007 149
Runaway globalization and the
cultural imagination of dependency
Runaway globalization and the cultural imagi-
nation of dependency
This essay argues that globalisation is nothing but a renewed ideological onslaught by the western powers to reify their culture
of racialised subjugation of Africa and other third world countries. To do so they persistently resort to the age old untenable
argument that climate and geography are responsible for Africa’s underdevelopment. Apart from shifting the blame of Africa’s
crises away from the effects of their direct actions, the climatic and geographic justifications for the African crises is an attempt to
justify racial inequality which works to the political and economic advantage of the West. Globalisation and globalism by their
nature and design therefore work hand in hand to ensure a hegemonic consciousness among Africans such that even their
responses to globalisation is imagined and mediated from the pedestal of dependence, thereby entrapping them further into the
conspiracy of Western globalised world. The way out for Africa is to respond to globalisation via the prism of “globalisation from
below”, that is, to continue to determine their terms for partaking in the global in the context of their own existence. Key
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Preamble1
The “facticity” of the factuality of globalization always tends to monumentalize itself,
obfuscating its systemic construct and rhetoric as ideologically and racially dimen-
sioned. Globalization therefore is propagated as ubiquitous and a given, it is seen
both as an intellectual concept as well as an ideological product. By this it describes
concrete conditions while at the same time it prescribes particular futures. However,
absent from within these conceptualizations and critique is Africa as a spatial and
epistemic presence (Magubane and Zeleza 2004:166). This essay examines the rela-
tionship of complicity between economic globalization and the spread of ideologies
that are not only “racialized” about African character, capabilities and potential but
also tries to locate Africa’s performance in the global phenomenon within a geo-
graphic and climatic articulation. By linking progress to climate and using environ-
ment to establish a hierarchy of regions neo-imperialist scholars reinscribe the supe-
riority of Europe and North America in the global equation. African response to
globalization paradoxically takes varied forms which incorporate ideologies from the
North. This can be found in the cultural imagination of dependency as expressed in
the media and other forms of cultural expression in Africa.
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Runaway globalization
Since the MacLuhan prediction of the  world as a global village became a reality  the
phenomenon of globalisation has acquired an inflationary character of runaway es-
pecially in the ways in which global finance seems to break ranks with traditional
information transfer constraints and regulation within national parameters or even
industrial productivity (Appadurai 2000: 3). No ideology has taken over the world so
comprehensively as globalism. This is because it is an ideology that constitutes and
constructs itself on every pedestal of being and becoming. On the political realm, it
serves liberal democracy as the quintessence of human and societal organisation, on
the economic front it prompts itself as the bastion of emancipation from poverty and
on the cultural arena where it delivers its most devastating blow it offers itself as the
gateway to human civilization and evolution. Yet with all these awesome credentials
or potentials, globalisation remains at best an uneven structural and ideological proc-
ess which engenders and spreads the culture and practice of unevenness and prefer-
ence that is determined by human constructed frameworks.   This runaway nature of
globalisation has been aptly captured by Appadurai (1996, 2000) as the “world of
flows”. He stresses however, that this flows “are not coeval, convergent, isomorphic,
or spatially consistent” but “relations of disjuncture” which catalyses difficulties and
attritions within local contexts leading to the “fundamental problems of livelihood,
equity, suffering, justice, and governance” (Appadurai 2000: 5).
As Roberts (2003) observes, global integration is galloping swiftly. This is illustrat-
ed by the fact that world trade increased faster than world economic growth by the
end of the 1990s (Bryson 1999). As a consequence, the economies of localities, regions
and nations and their people have been left at the mercy of international and transna-
tional webs of trade, finance and investment game plan. But while this integration
softens differences and difficulties for some, it has indeed become notoriously un-
even as it exacerbates spatial and social differences for others (Smith 1984; Harvey 1989,
1996). And as   Appadurai  (2000:4) rightly points out this unevenness echoes in the
resources for knowledge production that are essential for the democratisation of re-
search communities needed to produce a global view of globalisation. At the receiv-
ing end of this skewed discourse of globalisation is Africa which is excluded from the
place-determined and privileging of Eurocentric visions of the world as well as in
the ways it imagines globalization (Aina 1997; Mkandawire 1997).
Africa is not only depicted as “falling out of the world economy” in comparism to
happenings in East and Southeast Asia (Agnew and Grant 1997), it is also theorized as
a centre of perpetual crisis epistemologically, economically and culturally. The rhet-
oric of crisis that has dominated Western thought about Africa since the first tragic
encounter between the continent and Europe has not only continued to endure but
has continued to sustain the ideological essence it insists on propagating. Historical-
ly Africa has been part of the global process having a manifest presence in the socio-
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economic, political and cultural construction of the modern world albeit in a non-
beneficiary basis. The nature of globalization which accelerated rapidly in the twen-
tieth century clearly focused on new processes of subjugation which lies at the root of
what is called the African crisis. This new and hyper form of globalisation demon-
strates the severity of the orchestrated spread of ideologies of the West and its imposi-
tion on the rest of the world. The consequence of this phenomenon is what Hardt and
Negri (2000) allude to as the “spectral reign of global space” and underscores the
question posed by Gibson-Graham (2002) as to whether “a global regime is consoli-
dating itself not so much through institutional initiatives but through subjects who
experience themselves as increasingly subsumed to a global order”. By implication
those who are located within the local are designed to be subordinates incapable of
upturning that status. Natter (2004) points us to the fact that “the deployment of the
concept of globalization itself performs ideological effects that are part of globalism’s
own legitimization and seeming inevitability”.
Globalism as racialized ideology
For Africa, globalism has resurfaced the ideology of its supposed inferiority by theo-
rising climate as the bane of its development. A 2001 essay which was widely covered
in a broadcast report by one of the three major news networks in the USA, the ABC
television news on October 10, 2001 and subsequently on their website clearly illus-
trates the re-emergence of Hegel. In the ABC report, scientists publishing in the Jour-
nal of Economic Growth theorised that better economies are located in places with cold
weather. The economists tried to justify their claim by saying that colder weather was
responsible for the concentration of so much of the world’s wealth in temperate
regions rather than in the tropics. William Masters, the author of the study asserts:
“what we are finding is a 1 to 2 percent per year difference in growth rate between
temperate and tropical regions” and he goes on to chastise those who may be opposed
to the view that not withstanding the contribution of institutional factors, cold weather
will continue to determine who gets and stays rich and who stays poor (also Masters
and McMillan 2001).
Echoing this intellectual and academic justification of poverty that borders on
racism, Sachs argues that there is an economic connection between climate, geogra-
phy and society and calls for a shift from states to regional complexes defined by some
mix of environmental and cultural endowments. To Sachs this kind of mix enables a
better context for understanding how development works. He illustrates with Brazil
where he argues that the state would be better analysed by dividing the country
between a better endowed and technologically rich South and an environmentally
and culturally impoverished and technologically poor North (Sachs 2001, also Har-
vey 2001). Illustrating further, Sachs points to a range of countries in the tropics that
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are “geographically disadvantaged” and therefore are “cursed” with “geographical
penalty” and “geographical deficit” (Sachs 1997). Thus despite globalization or capi-
talism’s new universality many south countries will still be left behind (Bassin 2003).
To prosper therefore according to Sachs and Bassin, the tropics have to be in a de-
pendent relationship with the developed world that can then feed it with its temper-
ate-zone exports (Sachs 1997, Bassin 2003).
Even though the ABC report touted itself as the first time that economic and cultur-
al advancement has been linked directly to climate in which environment was theo-
rised as a justification for inequality of regions and their inhabitants, the reality is that
this racialized ideology has always occupied Western epistemology and thought. George
Louis Buffon’s A Natural History (1748–1804) and Carl von Linne’s  The System of Nature
(1735) are publications which expounded the notion that providence was responsible
for the hierarchical order in nature. To Buffon even though all humans derive from
one ancestry, biological and climatic causes stem differences in intelligence, habits and
customs. By his ordering, the European is the highest in the scale of human, moral,
rational and evolutionary capacity while non-Europeans are ranked lower (Buffon as
quoted in Natter 2004: 7). In his writings on race, Kant (1775) echoes Buffon and Linne
as he reaches the conclusion that the species of humans are made of distinctly four
varieties. The best was the original ideal human which was no longer in existence on
earth but which when in existence was located in the cold and temperate regions of
the world and as Eze (cited in Natter 2004: 7) quotes of his posthumous lectures on
physical geography, “humanity is at its greatest perfection in the race of the whites”.
This ideology that seeks divine explication for poverty using the pretext of differ-
ence creates the fundamental grounds for the kind of dependent relationship that
works to the advantage of Europe and the West but to the disadvantage of Africa. And
it is the basis, I submit for globalism and globalisation. The skewed nature of the
practice and dividends of globalization needs to be explained just like slavery was
explained, just like colonialism was explained and just like neo-colonialism which is
the forerunner of modern globalization was explained. Runaway globalisation says
Natter, echoing Bassin and Sachs “happily heralds the burgeoning universality of
triumphant capitalism” even as “divisions between societies and regions are going to
persist, and that economic-material-and thus human, social and civic-conditions will
most decidedly not converge” (Natter 2004: 8). Adegbola (2005) has craftily narrated
this condition of globalisation as the tyranny of the strong over the weak. Drawing
from history Adegbola shows how powerful individuals, nations and ideologies
have always expressed control over others as a means of satisfying their needs and
wants. He tells the story of the 12th century Mongolian conqueror Genghis Khan who
created one of the largest land empires in history from western and eastern Asia in
1209. Khan’s globalisation entrepreneurship was facilitated by efficient horseman-
ship and effective archery in addition to his astute military strategies and tactics. But
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as Adegbola points out, what Khan lacked was the capability to communicate with
his field commanders at the extremities of his vast empire. Today, in addition to a
more formidable war arsenal, the West have the supersonic capacity to turn our world
into a space of flows, thus providing the powerful with what the powerful normally
do, subjugate the weak (world) to feed its empire of globalisation as it has done for
centuries. And in the construction of this global empire, information and communi-
cation has become the greatest missile. We therefore need to critically understand
how differences in ecological, cultural, economic, political, and social conditions are
produced and to ascertain whether differences in geography are what in reality pro-
duce the unevenness and inequality of globalization.
Africa and globalism
To understand difference Lefebvre (1991) encourages us to examine the way and man-
ner in which production, reproduction and reconfiguration of space is the essence of
the political economy of capitalism and as Harvey (2001) adds, “the question is not
how globalization has affected geography, but how these distinctive geographical
processes of production and reconfiguration of space have created the specific condi-
tions of contemporary globalization”. What we see in effect is globalism’s efforts to
umbilically attach individual societies to the global capitalist economy in a way that
do not just re-produce capitalist relations that are extant, but rather reconstituting
simultaneously the scope of such relations in the process (Beck 1997, Luke 2003).
With specific reference to Africa this process has a long history dating back to the era
of slavery. Today attempts to discuss slavery are always treated as an escapist enter-
prise. Yet, we cannot ignore the ricocheting effects of that momentous historical expe-
rience. It cannot be wished away as agents of Western propaganda want us to do
simply because, it provides the major beginnings of the skewed relationship of uneven-
ness that characterize globalization and power relations in the world today. The same
justifications that undergird the slavery are the same rationalizations that produce
the ideology of globalism – a racialized explication of difference that positions black
Africans as “fetchers of wood and drawers of water” which continues to be the prism
through which blacks are still largely seen and regarded today.
The first wave of globalization can be rightly located in slavery and the mercantil-
ist economic system because it represents the driving essence of globalization: the
generation of economic, political, cultural and ideological intercourse between trans-
national and domestic structures in which one partner (transnational) is dominant.
Slavery as the linchpin of the mercantilist system enabled the mercantilist principle
of subordinating the economy of the colony to the metropole such that its exports are
sold solely to the “mother country” while its imports emanate from same. Williams
(1994: 65) argues that slavery “stimulated capitalism, provided employment for Brit-
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ish labour, and brought great profits to England”. Taken to the Americas to work on
sugar and cotton plantations, the enslaved produced the raw materials that fed the
industries in Britain. Slave labour was therefore a significant contributor to British
industrial enterprise which employed hundreds of thousands of Englishmen as Re-
natus Enys writing in 1663 attests: “the strength and sinews of this western world”
were the Negro slaves (quoted in Williams 1994: 30).
It is easy to see how slavery became an ideology that services a particular interest.
Slavery, Magubane and Zeleza (2004: 167), posits “was responsible for the emergence
of both racism and the ideology of race”. Having successfully dehumanised the black
race to its advantage, it was necessary to look for justifications to explain what obvi-
ously was beastly and inhuman hence racism became the consequence of slavery. As
explained by Pieterse (1995: 59) when the moral weight of slavery became too heavy
and it had to be abolished, racism became the buffer between abolition and equality.
With racism came the next wave of rationalization that Africans (blacks) are intellec-
tually inferior and therefore needed the guidance of superior white mentality to
progress or unfold into the process of human development. This was to pave the way
for the colonization of Africa.
Europe’s success with industrial capitalism necessitated a spread which unleashed
intense competition. To conquer and maintain markets for their produce as well as to
ensure adequate and continuous supply of raw materials, it was necessary to secure
the colonies. This then led to the scramble and the partition of Africa. To Boahen
(1987: 32) the scramble was an “almost hysterical reaction to the crisis in industrial
capitalism, feeding on fear that economic and hence political future of an industrial
country rested on the exclusive control of markets and raw materials”. Using coloni-
alism therefore the colonial powers were able to tie the economies and political cul-
tures of their colonies to the capitalist economies of the colonial powers, a system
which was vigorously sustained even after independence. Colonialism was also re-
sponsible for turning the colonies into export oriented cash crop based monocrop
production centres thereby killing or decreasing significantly food production and
the practice of diversification. Again even after independence, this pattern has large-
ly remained especially because independence was more of flag stuff than substance-
the former colonies were tied through trade, currency and foreign exchange earnings
to the apron strings of their ‘former’ colonial masters. As Magubane and Zeleza (2004:
169) point out, “the ideological dimensions of colonialism and the scramble for Africa
were both profound and enduring. The idea of race as a permanent, immutable,
biological characteristic by which the humanity of populations could be ranked
found its highest expression in the ideologies used to justify conquest and subjuga-
tion”.
The combined forces of slavery and colonialism produced a hegemonic order in
which Africans socialised into the ways of the west come to believe that Europe was
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superior in all dimensions, and even those that agree to racial equality still share
Europe’s superiority by believing that African interests are better served by subservi-
ence to Europe especially to the former colonial masters. In the mould of this crop of
Africans are elites produced by the colonial educational and political machinery
such as: Blaise Diagne, the Senegalese representative in the French Chamber of Dep-
uties, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Samuel Ajayi Crowther to name just a few. Thus when
independence was extracted, most of the Africans who took over were practicing the
systems of their departed colonial lords and virtually doing their bidding. Those that
tried to argue and struggle for real independence, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana
and Patrice Lumumba of Congo were hounded and killed by a conspiratorial web of
intrigue that is traceable to the former colonial masters and America. In addition to
elimination of perceived non-cooperationists and support for puppets rulers sympa-
thetic to them, the “former” colonial powers also employed several devices including
aids, loans and structural adjustment programmes to secure the dependence of Afri-
ca. Claude Ake (1995: 23) puts it succinctly: “uneven globalization is not only a proc-
ess but also an ongoing structuration of power” as much as it “is the hierarchization
of the world-economically, politically, and culturally-and the crystallizing of domi-
nation. It is a domination constituted essentially by economic power”.
The real import of globalization in Africa has been the various economic theoret-
ical experiments aimed primarily at servicing those that control the drivers of the
global machinery such as the IMF, World Bank and of course WTO. Structural adjust-
ment programmes and deregulation the twin forces of global relationship with Africa
have not only truncated post-independence development efforts but have led to
what Nabudere (2000: 53) aptly captures as the “third colonial occupation”. The La-
gos Plan of Action signed in 1980 by OAU heads of state insists that Africa is not
progressing because of deteriorating terms of trade, growing protectionism of wealthy
nations, high interest rates and burgeoning debt service commitments (The Lagos
Plan of Action, 1981). In an essay first published in 1968, Arrighi and Saul, argue that
“surplus absorption” which engendered the conspicuous consumption of urbanised
elites and sub-elites who are in bureaucratic employment coupled with the huge
consumption of “labour aristocracies”, the transfer abroad of profits, interests, divi-
dends while restraining the growth of agricultural productivity ensured the de-
pendence of African economies on world demand for primary products (Arrighi
2002: 11).  Advancing this argument further in 2002, Arrighi (2002: 17) explains that
what lies at root of the African crisis far from geography and race is “the nature of the
crisis that overtook world capitalism in the 1970s and in the response of the hegemon-
ic power, the United States, to it”. Arrighi (2002: 21) argues that the US which was a
major source of world liquidity in the 1950s and 1960s had by the 1980s become the
world’s largest recipient of foreign capital and therefore the world’s main debtor
nation.
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According to him:
This was a reversal of historic proportions that reflected an extraordinary, absolute
and relative, capacity of the US political economy to attract capital from all over the
world. It is likely that this was the single most important determinant of the con-
temporaneous reversal in the economic fortunes of North America and the bifur-
cation in the economic fortunes of Third World regions. For the redirection of
capital flows to the United States reflated both effective demand and investment in
North America, while deflating in the rest of the world. (Arrighi 2002: 22)
From the above it is obvious that far from inferiority status, far from climate and
geography, the enterprise of globalization was not designed to benefit all people,
rather it was racialized to explain and justify the tyranny of the powerful over the
weak, to foster an ideology of racial superiority which fertilizes a robust economic
condition that subjugates the African into a dependent relationship with the emper-
ors of the global empire. This is an empire in which some regions of the world muster
the power to compel the world market to work to its advantage while the others are
deceived into an almost fatal acceptance of the inevitability of globalism thereby
instituting a cultural imagination of dependency.
The cultural imagination of dependency
My first baptism into the cultural imagination of dependency happened when I tried
to convert from Protestantism to the Catholic Church. I was enthralled by the colour
and the spectacle (I guess) of the celebration of mass. I envied the altar boys who
looked like little fathers and the precision with which they go about their duties. I
like the orderliness and of course the fact that my senior brother was Catholic so that
even though I was in a Methodist mission high school, I chose to become Catholic.
After attending catechism and passed I was ready for baptism. I was told I had to
change my name since my indigenous name was equated with heathenism  as such
represents an identity of the devil to which we all Africans are automatically ascribed
until we are washed clean and delivered from his clutches by Christianity. As one of
the privileged beneficiaries of this deliverance, and a born again, it was incumbent
on me to change my name (read identity) to reflect my new status. Since I did not
know which names were good, or what they meant, my godfather an amiable school
teacher chose names for me. My baptismal name was Thomas and my confirmation
name was James. In one fell swoop my identity exemplified by my name Ijenkeri was
wiped out, I became so to say, a new creation answerable to the consciousness of the
English, whose names I have become invested with. After the renaming, I could not
possibly connect to the name, and when I went home during the school break and
told my father the story, he was furious. Not even the assurances that his name which
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I bear as my surname or family name was intact could calm him down. Thank God my
father was furious, because, I never used those names again.
The second incident came several years later. I had graduated from university with
a PhD was a lecturer and actor of repute having made several stage and television
appearances. It was in the year 2000 and the Director of the National Troupe of Nigeria,
Mr Bayo Oduneye and his deputy Dr Ahmed Yerima came to my university to audi-
tion for the production of Attahiru, a historical play about one of the sultans of Sokoto
who resisted colonialism. During the audition, the director was more interested in the
ability of the actors to speak like the queen, it does not matter that some of the actors
were award winners. When I noticed the director’s discomfiture at the way we were
pronouncing the English words, I made sure; I read lines from the play with the
heaviness of my accent. Of course none of us made the cast. I began to wonder was it
not bad enough that we going to do a Nigerian historical play in English? Must we
also speak it not in the way that it is spoken and understood in Nigeria, but the way it
is spoken and understood in England? And to say that this came from the apex cultur-
al establishment that is supposed to protect Nigerian identity was most disturbing.  As
I ruminated on the incident, I could not but wonder how our consciousness has been
enslaved and made dependent to an extent that quality and excellence can be meas-
ured in deference to what and how it exists in our former colonial motherland.
I paint these pictures to create the contextual basis for the way and manner in
which Africans are responding to globalization. We do not only react from the basis
of inferiority but also use the very paradigms that globalism use to construct us in
explicating ourselves and by so doing, venerating the hold of the global ideology on
us. The condition is so hegemonic that we have come to accept the “facticity” of it as
the factuality of the reality. In the realm of language where this finds eloquent eluci-
dation, the colonial language has not supplanted indigenous languages but is threat-
ening to annihilate many of them. Since language is “the fundamental space of flows”
and ‘the medium within which the totality of human knowledge is coded,” (Adegbo-
la 2005: 4) it means it is within language and its associated particulars that the global
media enterprise globalises. Language is the major ingredient of information which
is the brain and the heart of runaway globalization. While the empires of yore were
built by the force of arms, the global empire of today is built and secured by the
control and manipulation of information and information machinery: its generation,
dissemination and of course control.
Global information thrives on elaborate and intricate infrastructure which is al-
most for Africa one hundred percent imported. Like other technologies, Africa as a
created dependency lives on importation and technology transfer. Denied the ability
to develop its own technological momentum through dumping and the killing of
initiative, Africa suffers acute poverty of the infrastructure that gives expression to
effective information generation, manipulation and dissemination.  Even if the prob-
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lem of Africa’s poverty of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is re-
solved today, only a miserable percentage of the elite in Africa can take advantage of
it. The simple reason is that these ICTs have been designed to be understood and used
in the English language. The tyranny of English language even overwhelms other
European colonial languages like French, Portuguese and Spanish who struggle des-
perately to keep pace with the speed of English. The statistics speak for itself: 80% of
the content of the global ICT infrastructure is in English. Less than 3% of the content
of global information infrastructure is from Africa and even then most of this 3% is in
English (Adegbola 2005: 5). Since English is the dominant expression of the United
States of America and Great Britain, it is obvious in whose global empire the world
especially Africa is located.
In the global empire ICT firms and dealers are at the centre of a new world infor-
mation economy. To achieve this the national monopolies of the telecommunications
sector needed for security and national control of development have to be slaugh-
tered in the alter of deregulation and opening up of markets to international compe-
tition (the cardinal basis of globalization). Aronson (2001: 543) points out that “the
Thatcher-Reagan regulatory revolution undermined monopolists, encouraged do-
mestic and international communications competition in national and international
communications, and unleashed significant technological innovation” (read inva-
sion).  Nowhere is the control of the global information as devastating as in the movie
and television industry. In fact even predating the global information explosion,
movies and the television has been at the forefront of conveying the cultures and
values and by implication the ideology of the producers and spreading this to the rest
of the world in order to capture the imagination of others and hold them captive to
the alluring potentials of the producing society thereby creating a dependency syn-
drome. Miller, Govil, McMurria, Maxwell and Wang (2005: 9) disclose that US compa-
nies own 40–90% of movies shown in most parts of the world. In these movies “Los
Angeles–New York culture and commerce dominate screen entertainment around
the globe, either directly or as an implied other, and the dramatic success of US film
since the First World War has been a model for its export of music, television, adver-
tising, the Internet and sport”.
In essence the globalised world is a moment in which we are victims of “the global
triumph of the United States and its way of life” (Hobsbawm 1998: 1). The critical
force in the construction of this triumph is cultural domination. When you dominate
a people’s mental processes, it means you have arrested their ability to think and
conceptualize the world in any other but your image. The importance of this arrange-
ment is simple, the dominated are acculturated into believing and accepting that the
US is superior and what emanates from there must therefore be superior. Within this
superiority however, must be argued, is the real superiority of the white who own,
control and benefit from America’s triumph. Celebrating America’s triumph, a one
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time American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger declares: “globalization is really
another name for the dominant role of the United States” (cited in Miller et al 2005: 9).
In pursuit of this his consulting firm, Kissinger Associates, charges America to consol-
idate its global empire by winning “the battle of the world’s information flows, dom-
inating the airwaves as Great Britain once ruled the seas” and this is justified because
“Americans should not deny the fact that of all the nations in the history of the world,
theirs is the most just, the most tolerant, the most willing to constantly reassess and
improve itself, and the best model for the future” (Rothkopf 1997: 38, 74). Of course we
do know now that the charge has been fulfilled for the collapse of communism left
America alone to compete with itself in dominating the world. American liberal
democratic ideal and its free market project are the issues in the world today. The role
of American movies in ensuring the dominance of American racially based ideology
and globalization dates back to early 20th century. As early as 1912, it became clear to
exporters of Hollywood films that they were forerunners for the demand for US
goods. Indeed the US commerce Secretary in the 1920s, Herbert Hoover eulogised the
role of American movies as advancing “intellectual ideas and national ideals […] as a
powerful influence on behalf of American goods” (quoted in Grantham 2000: 53).
It is clear from all the above that our cultural imagining in Africa is that of depend-
ence and it is difficult to be otherwise as long as the current practice of globalization
sustains. Culture is critical and the reclaiming of it is instrumental to benefiting from
any global arrangement. Epskamp (1992: 243) alerts us to the fact that “culture is
necessary in order to give purpose and credibility to one’s own existence. Rob people
of their culture and you rob them of their reason of being.” Culture is the substance of
identity which expresses itself via common language, history, ethnicity and a sense of
belonging.  Culture is dynamic and not static but there still must be something recog-
nizable that binds individuals to the values of their communities and the distinctive-
ness of their being and which serves as the pedestal upon which they articulate and
manage their world. But when these capacities are taken away or supplanted by other
powerful cultures, then one becomes a perpetual appendage. As along as the western
idea of white superiority and the conviction that it represents the model of progress
remain, Africa will remain at best subjects of an imperial culture. Until what Agnew
and Corbridge (1995: 166) calls “the hegemony of ‘transnational liberalism’” is dis-
mantled our imaginings will continue to be constrained. Murden (2001: 459) captures
this eloquently:
The level of cultural penetration embedded in the new hegemony was unprece-
dented. The liberal politics of the West was translated into a wave of democratiza-
tion across the world. Just as significant was the influence of what Benjamin Barber
called McWorld: the inescapable experience of consumer icons, mostly American,
such as Coca Cola, McDonalds, Disney, Nike, and Sony, and a landscape of shop-
ping malls, cinemas, sports stadiums, and branded restaurants.
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As can be clearly seen the various attempts to rationalize globalization as beneficial to
all people of the world is a ruse, rather it is simply an ideological cover to dominate
others especially black Africans using a contrived argument of racial superiority to
justify inequality. In the process the US and Europe have been able to develop a
massive and daunting infrastructure of dominance, one which embeds to the con-
sciousness of Africans and make them to respond to globalization via the prism of
dependence.
Conclusion
Even though the major response to globalization remains the cultural imagination of
dependency, a few intellectuals and activists in Africa and the West, like the World
Social Forum and the International Forum on Globalization have been advocating
alternatives to the current global empire led by America. This alternative has been
located in “grassroots globalization” or “globalization from below” subsidiarity (Ap-
padurai 2000: 15; IFG 2002). The central and critical issue to this movement is that
people consciously enter the relationship of globalization at their own terms, of their
own volition and according to their own design, that they have control over the
process and the outcome and that it is recognised as their right to do so. At various
national and local levels also, reactions to globalization by these few have been to
perform exit from the state; disenchantment with the nature and operations of the
capitalist market and a rejection of the operations of the labour market. Relying in-
stead on the capacity of the people and their voluntary participation, these initiatives
and “globalization from below” converge in the arenas of agenda, ideology and prac-
tice. The initiatives and “globalization from below” are linked by their common
search for alternatives that are independent of the trappings of conventional globali-
zation wisdom, alternatives that focus on locality and relationships. Though this
search may not and is not without difficulties and contradictions, they nonetheless
capture the fervent of socio-cultural and economic relationships that are being con-
structed and reconstructed in a context that contests the ubiquitousness of globaliza-
tion. However, as Esteva (1992: 27) cautions, local initiatives “will not be able to sur-
vive the siege organised around us, unless an institutional inversion soon materialis-
es. Such change will only be possible if the myriad of local or even personal initia-
tives, now flourishing at grassroots, get not only momentum but public visibility,
articulating an alternative to the dominant discourse.”
Note
1. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Counter-narratives Conference, the University
of Winchester, United Kingdom, 3–6 April 2006.
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